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Abstract 
Much has been wntten about the discontmui~es takmg place in the 
post industnal society (Galbrath ( 1967), Marcuse (1 968). Bell (1 973), 
Toffler (1980), Huber (1984), Reich (199 l), Lewm and Stephens (1993), 
and Ilinitch, Lewin, and D'Aveni, (1998)) which are forcing multi- 
national companies and heretofore pnmarily domestic companies in 
every country and in almost every business sector to re-examine their 
management philosophies, strategies and organization designs In 
contrast to searching for a single theory of internationalization or for 
"the" theory of organizing for global compehhon, this paper focuses on 
the sources of vanation as a way of understanding the firm specific 
paths of companies' internahonalizahon and their organlzabon forms 
The paper extends the concept of equifinality (Katz and Kahn (19781, 
Doty, Glick, and Huber (1993). and Gresov and Drazin (1997)) for 
compehng in global environment and as a basis for understandmg why 
T h ~ s  research was made possible by the  generous support  of the IBM 
Consultant Group and the Nahonal Sclence Foundahon Grant #NSF-SBR- 
9411218 
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and how companies evolve unlque configurations of strategies and 
organizahon forms. The paper applies this framework to a discussion of 
Japanese companies 
1. Introduction 
Much has been written about discontinuities talung place in 
our post-industrial society (Galbraith (1 967), Marcuse (1968), 
Bell (1973), Toffler (1980), Huher (1984), Relch (1991), Lewin 
and Stephens (1993), and Ilinitch, Lewm, and D'Aveni (1998)), 
which are forcing multi-national and heretofore primarily 
domestic companies in almost every business sector to 
reexamine their management philosophies, and strategies and 
organization designs. These discontinuities, globalization of 
markets; an interdependent global economy; rapid changes in 
rules governing competition; increased pressures for time-based 
competition; demographic changes - aging of population in all 
developed countries, massive population movements, a declining 
educated and skilled work force in U.S., and emergence of 
technologically skilled work forces in less developed countries; 
demands of business to address extraeconomic goals; and 
demassification of the economy - the shift from mass markets 
to short-lived narrow specialized niches; all highlight the need 
for new business strategies and new forms of organizations 
appropnate for managing global competition 
In addition, the shift from standardized to various new forms of 
flexible manufacturing has been enabled by quantum changes in 
technology, such as computer integrated manufacturing systems, 
computer-aided design and electronic data interchange. And 
revolutionary advances in computer-mediated communication 
technology - convergence of telecommunications, office 
automation, data processing and video technologies (Culnan and 
Marcus (1987), Huber (1990), Tessler (1991), and Fulk and 
DeSanctis, Forthcoming (1999)) - have given managers radical 
new options for designing and experimenting with new 
organization forms. 
In the face of these shared discontinuities, a consensus is 
emerging among many scholars and popular business  
chroniclers about the requisite organizahonal capabilities of the 
new forms of organizahon (Hage (1988), Rose (1990), Dumaine 
Managrng Global Competrtron Japanese Companres In Translt~on 3 
(1991). Lewin and Stephen (1993), and Volberda (1998)). The 
design of organizahons that are flemble and adaptive, that can 
institutionalize receptivity to change and innovation, that are 
able to fully develop their human resources, that use technology 
in strategic and synergistic ways and that are global m scope, 
perhaps represent the most significant capabilities of the new 
forms. 
A study (Droege (1994)) of organizational change episodes 
indicates that  almost every multinational corporation in 
Germany, Japan and the U.S. is lnvolved m some restructuring 
or reorganization in a quest to achieve organizational capabilities 
for managing global competibon. The Econorntst (1994) reported 
that AT&T admitted to paying in 1993 about $347 million to 
consultants for help in its global reorganization efforts. Similarly 
the Ford Motor Company is in the final phases of a bold plan - 
Ford 2000 - to transform itself into a "borderless" firm. While a 
company like Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) i s  held up  a s  a 
prototypical model of the mulhcultural, transnational company 
with its unique matrix organization (Bartlett and Ghoshal 
(1993)), other companies such as  Dow Chemical and Citibank 
are, at the same time, dematrixing their organizations for 
simpler regionally centered or worldwde product structures. 
Historically management gurus and many scholars have 
sought to identify "the" organizational solution for designing and 
managing the multicultural, multinational corporation. The 
art iculat ion of organizational configurations such  a s  
transnational organization (Bartlett and Ghoshal (1988)), 
heterarchy (Hedlund (1986), Hedlund and Rolander (1 990)). 
perpetual matrix (Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989)), borderless 
corporation (e.g. Business Week (1994)), network organization 
(Nolan (1988), Miles and Snow (1986, 1992)) and various 
theories of internationalization (for a revlew, see Melm (1992)) 
have served to draw attention to the contradiction of designing 
and managing organizations that are in the words of Percy 
Barnevik simultaneously "global and local, big and small, 
decentralized with centralized reporting" (Taylor (1991), ABB 
(1991)) 
It is clear that no single dominant organization form has 
emerged a s  prototypical of the one best way to design and 
manage the multicultural, transnational firm (cf. Doz and 
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Prahalad (1991)). If anything lt is possible to identify In almost 
every Industry effective, vlgorous, Intensely competitlve firms 
executing strategies and organization designs ldiosyncratlc to 
them. Examples Include Unilever, Procter & Gamble, ABB, 
Slemens and Toshiba It 1s also clear that strategies, however 
unique, can only succeed within the limits enabled and 
restricted by the  organlzation history of strategic and 
organization adaptations ( L e m ,  Long, and Carroll (1998)). 
Thus, it seems to us  that focuslng on explaining sources of 
variation in organizational configurations will contribute to 
understanding of why organizations develop distinct capabilities 
In thls paper, we extend the concept of equifinallty (Katz and 
Kahn (1978), Doty, Glick, and Huber (1993), and Gresov and 
Drazin (1997)) in the context of the evolvlng globalization of 
organizations by examining the  translt lon of Japanese  
companles to managlng global competition. Slmply put ,  
equifinality is the premise that  multlple strategies and/or 
organizational forms a r e  equally effective In the  same 
competitlve environment (Katz and Kahn (1978), Doty, Glick, 
and Huber (1993), and Gresov and Drazin (1997)). 
2. The Many Paths to Internationalization 
A review of the internationalization literature suggests that 
many factors underlie the vanations In why and how companles 
internationalize. These sources of vanahon have their origin m 
the firm's compebtive envlronment and managerial cognibon of 
that environment, country form of capitalism, firm hlstory of 
strategic and historical adaptations and strategic intent. 
Figure 1 i l lustrates our  conception of a firm's global 
organization configurahon, at a point in time, as an idiosyncratic 
culmination of many factors It 1s intended to portray the 
complexity and path dependency of the process of evolvlng a 
global organlzation configuratlon. 
Factors In the external envlronment Include the firm's 
cognition - interpretation - of its competitlve dynamics, 
polltical forces such as  international trade pressures (the case of 
Japan), and country form of capitalism reflecting its history, 
unique cultural dimensions, role of government m the economy 
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'example m parcnthcsls are drawn From analysts ofToyota case 
Figure 1. The Dynamics of Idiosyncratic Evolution of Global 
Organization Form 
and the structure of capital markets (Lewin, Long, and Carroll 
(1998)). For example, the tacit and explicit knowledge of Bntish 
international trade was largely shaped by the structure of the 
Bntish Empire and the role of the colonies as  sources of raw 
materials and as captlve markets for the products of British 
industry. Following World War I1 and the dissolution of the 
empire, British Industry had to contend wth two major forces: 
the internal politics of successive cycles of nabonalizabon and 
privatization and the need to adapt to a new constellation of 
global competitors. Similarly, the internationallzation of Japan 
dates back to the Meqi period and to the opening up of Japan to 
the Western influence advocated by such men a s  Fukuzawa 
Yukichi (the founder of Keio University) and Shlbusawa Eilchi 
(the founder of Hitotsubashi University). However, up to World 
War I1 Japan was primanly importing machinery from the West 
and cotton from China and India, and exporting textiles, like 
sllk, and food products like nce. Trading companies accounted 
for most of this trade (Kawabe (1982), Yoshlno and Lifson 
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(1986)). As we discuss in a later section, the existence of these 
trading companies was very important to the export trade of 
Japan after World War 11. 
Factors in the internal environment include the company 
history of strategic and organization adaptations, administrative 
heritage, distinctive capabilities, and the  strategy and 
organization design in place. 
Strategic intent captures the particularistic outcomes of the 
ongoing interaction of managerial cognition of the firm's 
competitive dynamics, of the role of shared understandings, and 
of the formulation and/or emergence of strategic direction. The 
choice of specific strategies may be partially a function of one or 
more factors. 
The decision to enter new geographic markets may be a result 
of competitive dynamics such as an exchange of threat (Graham 
(1974, 1978)), following the leader (Knickerbocker (1973)), 
intense domestic competition and/or small or medium domeshc 
market share (Hemart and Park (1994)); and/or it may be due 
to a top management vision of the shape of the emerging 
competition (Hamel and Prahalad (1994)). An export strategy 
may result from a national industrial policy, the need to exploit 
economies of scale, a small domestic market (e.g. SKF) and/or 
the maturing of the product life cycle (Vernon (1966)). In other 
cases, exports may be triggered by existing sim~larity m market 
demand due to geographical proximity - "psychic distance" 
(Johanson and Vahlne (1 977)). Locatmg production facilibes in 
other countries may result from a desire to benefit from "cheap 
hands," "quickest b rms ,"  or the need to loosen the constraints 
of a small domestic market, currency appreciation (high yen), 
and/or a need to respond to trade pressures and be perceived as  
a local employer, or to gain political goodwill or fiscal 
concessions. A diversification strategy or the formation of 
alliances may result from several factors such a s  national 
industrial (technology) policy, company history (e.g. Corning, see 
Bartlett (1990)), small domestic market, intense domestic 
competition, and/or the need to achieve economies of scope (e.g. 
Canon), or a need to shift the business focus from a maturing 
industry to a growth industry (e.g. Hoffman-la Roche has  
recently purchased Genentech and Syntex in the U.S. to expand 
into biotechnology). Technology acquisition strategy may result 
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from the needs to (a) balance lack of distinctive competence, (b) 
compensate for shortage in scientific and engineering specialists, 
(c) diversify scientific bases, and/or from (d) a heed to respond to 
political pressure. 
In th is  paper we a re  emphasizing the  antecedent and 
managerial choice variables which can affect the configuration of 
strategy and organization form. However, managerial discretion, 
top management turnover, trial and error processes and 
serendipity operate as  control variables and must also be viewed 
as  potenhally important sources of variations, which culminate 
in particulansbc organization configuration. Strategic choices to 
leapfrog or imitate competitors can be outcomes of managenal 
discretion. Similarly trial and error processes, learning from 
samples of one or less (March, Sproull, Tamuz (1991)) and 
serendipity can be important in understanding emergent 
strategies. The many possible paths that  firms can follow 
towards developing particulanstic organization configurations 
are illustrated in Figure 2. 
Antecedent Variables 
G c ~ l m t ~ d  F o m  
. - . - . . - 
I 
Anlecedent Vanabler 
Figure 2. The Many Patha to Internationalization 
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3. Thd Early Internationalization of Japan 
Following World War 11, Japan's imperabve was to stabilize its 
society, rebuild wealth for the total society, re-generate a high 
standard of livmg, and rebuild a strong industrial base which 
could support the development of other industries and maintain 
Japan's economic independence. Guided by MITI, Japan first 
concentrated on rebuilding basic industries in electricity, steel, 
chemicals, and cement. 
Government policies initially focused on (a) high added value 
products which used relatively few imported materials, (b) 
manufacturers that could export their products as a means of 
financing import of essential raw materials and energy, (c) 
promoting intense competition in the market place while 
shielding companies from external compebtion to allow nascent 
internal markets to develop, (d) importing technology and drivlng 
costs lower by continuously enhancing these technologies, and 
(e) developing social policies supporting a low cost capital 
strategy such a s  encouragement of personal savings, limited 
social security programs, limited national defense, low inflation, 
and long-term oriented patient capital structure (cf. World Bank 
(1 993)). 
These policies were mutually reinforcing. Forcing companies to 
compete vigorously promotes "competing" atbtudes and hones 
managerial skills and organizational capabilities, which thnve on 
winning (cf. Parhnson and Amikura (1994)). A patient capital 
structure with banks taking equity-like positions and extensive 
crossholding of shares  between companies in a group,  
contnbute to a long-term orientation and to a preference for 
long-term investments and building market share. Limited social 
security obligations encourage personal savings and low cost of 
capital Keeping government costs low, mostly through lower 
social welfare costs and limited defense efforts, reduces the tax 
burden and lowers government financing needs, thus increasing 
the pool of capital for investment and reducing the cost of 
capital. Virtual life time employment increases mllingness of 
companies to invest in human capital which contributes to 
continuous improvement and higher manufacturing 
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productivity 
In summary, Japan's situation after World War I1 and the 
implementation of social and economic reconstruction policies 
shaped the early emphasis on exports. It also created an intense 
domestic culture of competition. Being removed from world 
markets, Japan emphasized relatively standardized products at 
high quality and low cost a s  a means of penetrating world 
markets, in parhcular, consumer electronics, automobiles, office 
equipment, electronic components, and industrial machinery. 
In the initial stages of building export markets, Japanese 
trading companies provided the  crucial knowledge of 
international trade (Kawabe ( 1982), Yoshino and Lifson ( 1986)). 
Japanese companies were able to focus on product design and 
manufacturing relying on the trading companies to be the 
knowledge link to the  market  and  to bear the  r isk of 
international trade. Although their role 1s changing, Japanese 
trading companies continue to have a n  important role in 
facilitating and  s t ructur ing J apanese  global trading 
transacbons. 
As a result, the initial thrust  of internationalization by 
Japanese companies was built on an  export strategy. The oil 
shocks of 1970 and 1974 intensified the national priority on 
exports (to pay for the dramatic price escalation of 011) and also 
triggered a drive for quantum leaps in industrial efficiency 
primanly to conserve energy. The Plaza Accord in 1985 and the 
contmual rapid appreciation of the yen, and trade frictions with 
the U.S  and Europe gave impetus to the establishment of 
manufactunng facilities abroad. Even though Japan accounted 
for 9.4% of world exports in 1988 (Itami (1994)), the Japanese 
economy is much less dependent on exports than, for example, 
Germany (9 4% of GNP compared to 26.8%). However, the 
concentration of these exports in the machinery and consumer 
electronics industries reflects the national policies, which guided 
the development of the internationalizahon of Japan Whereas 
the average percentage of sales exported by Japanese companies 
in 1988 was 20.996, the machmery industry accounted for 78% 
of manufacturing exports (Itami (1 994)). This suggests that 
companies in industries such as  automobile manufacturing 
(including parts suppl~ers) ,  consumer electronics, business 
equipment, and heavy engineering were leading the way in 
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Japan ' s  internationalization. It mlght be noted t ha t  
manufactured products constitute over 95% of Japan exports 
overall, whereas in the U.S. ~t is around 75% and in the U.K 
about 80% (World Competitiveness Report (1 993)). 
4. Japan Globalization Strategies 
The global intent of Japanese companies has shifted from 
developing basic manufactumg capabilities emphasuing volume 
after World War I1 to emphaslzlng quality in the 70s and 80s. In 
the late 80s and early 90s, the dominant logic driving global 
operations has been investing in offshore production facilities in 
which strong manufacturing systems and skllls have been 
replicated abroad in a centralued hub form Towards the mld- 
90s knowledge acquisition, in particular, has emerged a s  a 
global intent in companies seeking to develop innovative R&D 
capability. 
In the following, we describe four globaluation strategies found 
in the companies given as  examples. These strategies evolve 
around localization configurations that are ~diosyncrahc to the 
particular companies mentioned, yet they are outcomes of 
organizational evolutions over tlme. Rarely have the compames 
succeeded in  leapfrogging the  competition by a novel 
configuration. The notoriously poor record of Japanese  
companies m acquisitions is a case in pomt. 
5. Localization Strategy 
Localization refers to Japanese direct investment strategies in 
overseas production facilities to counter trade barriers, secure 
existmg markets, cope w th  high production costs in Japan, and 
be perceived as  local producer (Chang (1995)). In contrast to the 
practice of U.S. companies which establish offshore 
manufacturing plants  primarily for the  purpose of 
manufacturing abroad and importing to the U.S., Japanese 
localization strategy 1s designed to serve the market within 
which the manufacturing takes place (Johansson and Ylp 
(1994)). Wlth the exception of consumer electronics, very few 
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products manufactured offshore are imported back to Japan. 
This trend might change, however, as  the 90s draw to a close. 
Although in 1988 Japan ' s  ratio of overseas to domestic 
produckon was about 5% (compared to 20% for Germany), it is 
important to recognize that the shift to localizahon occurred in 
response to trade fnction and the rapid appreciation of the yen 
after the Plaza Accord. The shift also served to secure local 
markets first captured through exports. 
To execute localization strategy, Japanese companies chose to 
replicate their successful forms of organization and management 
practices (in particular manufacturing) in the host countries. 
The automobile industry probably represents the most elaborate 
example. In 1982, Honda was the first Japanese automobile 
manufacturer to establish an assembly operation m the U.S. m 
Marrysville, Ohio. Other manufacturers followed, Nissan in 
Smyrna, Tennessee; Toyota in Georgetown, Kentucky; Mazda in 
Flat Rock, Michigan. Fuji Heavy Industries estabhshed Subaru- 
Isuzu a joint venture in Lafayette, Indiana, and Mitsubishi 
formed a joint production venture with Chrysler near  
Bloomington and Normal, Illinois. Replicating the production 
system for automobiles in a host country requires the transfer of 
the many production stages. In the case of Japanese auto 
manufacturers, it involved replicating the parts supplier system 
in the U.S. and establishing the many support systems at  the 
final production and assembly locations. In the case of Toyota, 
the factory in Kentucky replicates the Toyota manufacturing 
system, supported by a supplier network (primarily Japanese 
suppliers affiliated w t h  Toyota in Japan but also many U.S. 
parts makers) and a design and engineering center in California 
w th  the mission of designing cars for the U.S. market. 
Toyota provides a leading example of how localizahon might 
proceed in a host country Toyota U.S. is intended to become 
self-sufficient in its ability to design and produce for the U.S. 
market. However, certain specialized capabilities such as engine 
research, engineering, and manufacturing systems remain 
centered in Japan. At the same time, Toyota U.S. is integrated 
with Japan in various symbiotic ways. The NUMMI jomt venture 
w th  GM in Fremont, California served as the "test tube baby" 
case for Toyota localization strategy in the U.S. The Tawara 
"mother" plant was the  source of manufacturing and  
12 Seoul Journal of Busrness 
management know-how implemented a t  NUMMI. When the 
Toyota factory in Georgetown, Kentucky was built Tawara and 
Fremont (NUMMI) served as  the "mother" factones. However, 
once the factory was operational, it became part of the Toyota 
network of "sister" factories which continually exchange, share, 
and adopt one another's manufacturing innovations. 
At Honda, the replication of the production system did not 
involve as tight a symbiotic relationship a s  a t  Toyota. The 
Marrysville, Ohio factory developed various indigenous 
manufacturing practices and innovations, which were not 
shared with Honda factories in Japan.  These indigenous 
adaptat ions  to the  manufacturing process became a 
manufacturability issue when Honda was planning the new 
Accord. Manufacturing teams from Ohio had to become involved 
in the design of the manufacturing process because the 
vanations, which had developed in Ohio, had not been shared 
w t h  other plants (Business Week (1993)). 
The success of Japanese auto manufacturers in replicating 
their manufacturing system and supplier networks in the U.S. 
demonstrates the importance of building on idiosyncratic 
organizational capabilities. What Honda, Nissan and Toyota set 
out to do was to replicate their core organizational capabilities 
and processes while also making adaptations to accommodate 
certain statutes (OSHA, EEO, Environmental Protection) and 
human resource management practices (Ishida (1986)). All else 
equal, firms can be expected to want to replicate, in a host 
country, the organization forms and practices which are the 
basis of their competitive advantage. In the case of Japan, it is 
clear that on balance, replication has  been the dominant 
approach to implementing localization in host countries w th  a 
centralized hub organizational configuration. The similanties in 
systems and practices between J apan  and host country 
operations are far great than the differences. Yet, the companies 
urlll vary in their approach to localizabon as illustrated by the 
companson of Toyota and Nissan m Table 1. 
6. Alliance Strategy 
Burton and Saelens (1994.67) conclude that Japanese firms 
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Table 1. Comparison of Globalization Strategy of Two Japanese Automotive 
Companies 1992 
Toyota Nissan 
Total 4,895,000 3,015,000 
Producbon Volume 
-produced overseas ('92) 700,000 600,000 
Plants Overseas Brazil, Canada, India, Mexlco, Span, U.K and U S 
Philippmes, South Afnca, 
Thaland, U.K. and U S 
Plants in U S TMM (Kentucky) NMMC (Tennessee) 
-Founded 1988 (1 984 NUMMI) 1983 
--Capacity 400,000 450,000 
-Product Camry Centra 
Number of Employees 3,500 5,000 
Japanese 200 25 
President Japanese Arnencan (From Ford) 
Mother Factory (Source of Tawara and NUMMI Atsug (mibal b u n g  
Local Knowledge) (Fremont) ground of Tennessee Workers) 
Knowledge Transfer Tightly linked Loosely llnked 
Tawara + TMM and 
B 
NUMMI 
Car Design Center R&D Planned for 96 N A. 
Localuabon Policy Toyota-uahon Localuabon 
(Transplant Toyota's (Uhlue local competencies 
knowledge as much as and knowledge) 
possible) 
have histoncally focused their alliances on "exportmg products 
and imporbng technology," policies that were supported by the 
industrial history of Japan. Increasingly, however, there are calls 
for strategic collaboration that "evolve as living systems" (Kanter 
(1994: 97)) and focus on creahng value and knowledge together 
(Teramoto et al. (1994)). The notion of a joint venture a s  an  
exchange of resources and skills limited to a contractual 
obligation (e.g. Hamel, Doz, and Prahalad (1989)) is givlng way to 
strategic collaboration nurtured as  a relationship between two 
partners (Kanter (1994)) Such relationship maintenance has 
long been a core capability of Japanese companies, which 
generally give higher priority to alliances than their Western 
counterparts (Burton and Saelens ( 1994)). Japanese companies 
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are also noted for having a higher learning capability in the 
collaborative relationship (Teramoto et al. (1 994)), and thus tend 
to benefit more from the alliance through learning than their 
Western partners (Hamel (1991)). There are, nevertheless. 
differences between the alliance strategies and capabilities of 
Japanese companies. NEC, for example, has only recently 
intensified its involvement. In 1989, NEC entered into a n  
alliance with MIPS Computer Systems to acquire RISC- 
technology, and in 1990 it made a mde-ranging agreement with 
AT&T in semiconductors (Teramoto et al. (1994)). 
Toshiba provides a n  example of a n  alliance a s  a global 
collaborative strategy. Toshiba has a history of cooperation 
dating back to early 1900 and its partnership with General 
Electric. Beginning in the 1990s. Toshiba envisioned a future 
based increasingly on a network of strategic collaboration 
agreements. These include Motorola on semiconductors, 
Siemens on joint second sourcing agreements, IBM on color flat- 
panel displays, Apple on multimedia, Sarnsung on flash memory 
chips, and Time Warner on entertainment to mention but a few 
partners worldwide. The rationale for the alliance strategy, 
according to President Fumio Sato, is technological complexity 
and diversity of world markets. "It is no longer an era in which a 
single company can dominate any technology or business by 
itself ...y ou simply can't expect to be best at the whole process 
any longer" (Fortune (1993: 44)). Furthermore, the product 
development costs are so high that no single company may be 
able to fund research - the next generation DRAM memory 
chip, for example, is expected to cost more than $1 billion to 
develop Today most companies are forced to cooperate on 
particular technologies in which they lack competence or 
resources (Kanter (1994), Hamel, Doz and Prahalad (1989)). 
Toshiba has long developed and nurtured alliances as a strategic 
capability and does not consider them as a last resort. 
Another example of the alliance strategy is Canon. Long 
perceived as  pursuing market dominance as  a sole objective, 
Canon now seeks  to shift i t s  strategy towards a more 
harmonious state of cooperation/competition that is called 
symbiosis. "Symbiosis with global partners" is partly a response 
to increasing trade friction threatening the export markets of 
Japanese products (cf. Teramoro et al. (1994)). More than a 
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traditional joint venture, symbiotic alliances aim at technology 
and product development linked to corporate strategic objectives 
shared by both partners (Banks and Baranson (1993)). Such 
alliances increase mutua l  global dependency of major 
competitors and test their ability to cooperate in some areas 
while competing in others (Harnel and Prahalad (1994)). 
7. Acquisition Strategy 
Some of the more ballyhooed acquisitions in the 1980's 
included Sony's takeover of Columbia Pictures, followed by 
Matsushita's $6.1 billion takeover of MCA in the 1990. These 
acquisitions were seen as  "natural extensions of . . . long-term 
goals of linking media software development with the hardware 
needed for everyday personal use" (Odaka (199 1)). Sony has 
since attempted to restructure while suffering from heavy losses 
attributed to Sony Pictures Entertainment (Economist, Nov. 19 
(1994)). Matsushita failed to cope with the demands for more 
autonomy by the MCA management (Grover (1994)) who 
resented Osaka for rejecting further acquisition proposals in the 
entertainment industry (Yamakawa, Otalu, Anzai (1995)). The 
hoped for synergies have thus failed to materialize although 
Sony is still persisting in developing its audio-visual competitive 
posihon. 
These two acquisitions represent attempts to leapfrog the 
acquisition of an organizational capability which the acquiring 
company i s  lagging or missing such  a s  software. Such  
acquisitions are difficult to integrate partly due to the different 
cultures embedded in the manufacturing of hardware and in the 
management of creative talent, of films, and of software design. 
In addition, diversification into a radically different kind of 
industry is challenging even without the problems of integratmg 
two diverse corporate cultures. 
Another example of the acquisition strategy is  Fujitsu's 
takeover of ICL in 1990. As ICL was relatively dependent on 
Fujitsu chips and components in its manufactumg, it can be 
seen as an extension to the previous technological cooperation 
between the two companies, giving Fujitsu a lead in the 
takeover. While some question the benefits of the acquisition to 
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Fujitsu, ~t seems to represent an attempt to leapfrog into the 
European market (Management Today (1992)). By using ICL's 
markehng and manufacturing strength in Europe, Fujitsu may 
have also aspired to mount a challenge to Hitachi and NEC in 
the European markets (Smlth and Major (1990)). Because of 
polltlcal pressures, Fujitsu has managed the acqulsltion a t  
arms-length, allowing ICL to retain its independence and 
assuring its long-term survival. ICL conhues  to be run by its 
UK executives, with only two Japanese managers residing in 
London (Economist, Apr. 10 (1993)). At the same bme, the two 
companies cooperate outslde the UK and Japan.  This has 
allowed Fujltsu to earn political goodwll m the U K. as ~t has 
helped to substanbate the continuing ICL autonomy Although 
Fujltsu may see ICL as a part of ~ t s  emerging global federation of 
companies, the local integrated capability of Fujitsu/ICL may 
emerge very incrementally 
A thlrd acquisition example is the $2.6 billion takeover of 
Flrestone by Bndgestone m 1988. This acquisition was most 
llkely motivated by the dynarnlcs of the worldwde tire Industry 
which was undergoing consolidation to achieve economies of 
scale in markets and production Flrestone may have 
acknowledged its incapacity to compete in global tire markets 
and approached Brldgestone for the  bld (Nevln (1989)). 
Bridgestone may have further decided to acqulre Flrestone to 
better serve Japanese auto makers abroad (Economist, Sept. 7 
(1991)). However, Bridgestone was forced to upgrade the 
manufactunng capabilities of Firestone (Kerr (1992), F~nancial 
Tlmes, May 17 (1991)). Not surpnsmgly, Birdgestone, a winner 
of the  Deming award,  replicated i t s  organizational and 
manufacturing core capabilities in Firestone, bringing m a 
Japanese CEO, Yoichiro Kaizaki. As Bridgestone/F~restone Inc. 
suffered a loss of $358 million, bringing the parents' earnings 
down with 53% in 1990 (Halden (199 I)), there are concerns that 
Bridgestone paid too much and moved too slowly to integrate the 
acquisition. 
As these acquisition examples ~llustrate,  the competltlve 
dynamics that motivated each acquisition differed. Sony and 
Matsushita pursued a capability unrelated to thelr traditional 
core buslness but vlewed strategic by the top management. 
Matsushita, however, may have partly been driven to buy MCA 
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a s  an  imitative move, seeking to neutralize any competitive 
advantage that  Sony might have gained by its first-mover 
acquisition of Columbia Pictures. Matsushlta's wllingness to sell 
majorlty to Seagram supports this vlew a s  in retrospect the 
consumer electronics giant's entry into Hollywood appears a 
costly mistake. 
The Fujitsu/ICL example serves to point to an  acquisition 
strategy to bulld a global federation of relatively Independent 
companies, motivated by political sensitivity of strategic 
acquisitions. Thls type of global strategy pursues cooperation 
and autonomy among the unlts m thlrd countnes, yet may later 
emerge towards a more unified compehtlve front. Bndgestone/ 
Flrestone 1s an  example of a replication strategy implemented 
through an acquisihon and motivated by aspirahons for a wider 
global market position. What all these examples suggest, 
however, 1s that an acquisltlon strategy has been a very costly 
and uncertain form of globalization, perhaps one in whlch the 
Japanese companies have been at their weakest as  globallzers. It 
is not due to a lack of strategic ends pursued, but rather due to 
the difficulty encountered 1r1 their implementahon. 
8. R&D Strategy 
U.S. and European companies have long acknowledged the 
benefits of dolng R&D for a particular market place locally 
(Johnstone (1992)). In recent years, there has been a marked 
lncrease In locating engineering deslgn centers and R&D 
laboratories outside of Japan.  For example, Japanese R&D 
expenditures in the U.S. mcreased almost tenfold between 1983 
and 1990 (MITI (1 99 1)). The strategic rationale for locallzing 
research and development overseas involve (a) technical 
capability to satisfy local market (e.g. the Toyota design center m 
California), (b) proximity to local science bases, (c) increasing 
diversity of research perspectives to compensate for creahvlty of 
Japanese researchers. (d) countering shortage of englneerlng 
and sclence speclalists m Japan, and (e) responding to polltical 
pressures. With a few excephons (e.g. Toyota m the U.S., Nlssan 
in the U.K.), the R&D centers of Japanese companies were not 
established to support  exlsting production or marketing 
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activities. The great majority of R&D centers overseas are 
involved in basic research to support core technologies back m 
Japan. 
The overseas R&D strategies of Japanese companies involve 
three basic approaches - affiliated research centers, stand- 
alone research centers, and contract research. Similar to a 
research strategy employed by pharmaceutical companies in the 
U.S., Japanese companies have established research centers 
affiliated with universities (e.g. Aisin Seiki U.K. Research 
Laboratory a t  the University of Sussex, Hitachi Cambridge 
Laboratory). However, this strategy has been most preferred by 
pharmaceutical companies such as Yarnanouchi and Eisai. Also 
prevalent are stand alone centers such as  the Nissan European 
Technology Center at Cranfield, Kobe Steel Research at Research 
Triangle Park in North Carolina, and the Canon Research 
Europe in Guildford, U.K. 
All in all in 1989 Japanese companies had 188 research 
centers (MITI (1992)). Japanese multinational corporations have 
thus embarked on the globalization of R&D, partly in search for 
innovation a s  a competitive advantage (Papanastassiou and 
Pearce ( 1994)). By hiring foreign researchers, these companies 
seek basic research skills and innovative mindsets (Swinbanks 
(1993)). Yet the management of foreign researchers is still 
problematic (Bloom (1 990). Cairncross (1 994)). 
9. Conclusion 
We have argued that Japan, in response to a new constellation 
of factors in its external environment-trade frictions, yen 
appreciation, demassification of markets, high domestic 
manufacturing costs, maturing product life cycles-is moving 
away from exports a s  its primary form of participation in 
international trade. Japan's  approach to managing global 
competition in the 1990's and beyond involves a focus on 
globalization strategies-localization, alliances, acquisibon, and 
globalizing upstream capabilities. 
Localization involves replicating, in host  countries,  
organization capabilities which have been the source of 
Japanese competitive advantage in the past. Localization has 
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been a very successful strategy for Japanese  companies 
especially where the objective is to secure markets, achieve local 
responsiveness and diffuse trade friction. In such industries as 
automobiles, consumer electronics, and office equipment the 
J apanese  management approach h a s  been successfully 
implemented in host countries. 
The Japanese  have made adjustments to accommodate 
different employment statutes and other cultural differences. 
However, the more the replication adheres to capabilities honed 
back home the more coherent and successful the operation 
overseas (e.g. Toyota and Nissan in the U.S.). 
The formation of alliances is another globalization strategy 
which is well-suited to Japanese management style. Alliances 
are seen as  useful for establishing symbiotic relationships with 
potential global partners (e.g. Canon with Apple and Hewlett- 
Packard). The alliances are a means to acquiring or leveraging 
capabilities in technology, product development, market access 
and/or distribution. The Japanese have had much success 
domestically with various forms of alliances and more recently 
with partners (and often competitors) abroad. Their success is 
due, to a great extent, to a preference for evolving long-term 
relationships. We therefore expect a n  increase in Japanese 
alliance activity. 
Unlike in the U.S., mergers and acquisitions by Japanese 
companies of foreign companies have been rare. In the case of 
Sony and  Matsushita,  the  purpose was to leapfrog the  
acquisition of markets and core competenc~es (e g. film making, 
multimedia software design) which the two firms were totally 
lacking. However mergers and acquisitions in general are 
difficult to integrate because of divergent administrative heritage 
and embedded different cultures (Economist, Sept. 10 (1994)). 
Integrating acquired companies has proved even more difficult 
for Japanese companies. Sony has  been forced to adopt a 
regional autonomy approach for its Columbia Pictures and CBS 
record divisions in the U.S. In our view, acquisitions of foreign 
companies are not likely to become a major feature of Japanese 
globalization strategies. 
Upstream globalization of research and  development 
capabilities seems to address a major need of Japanese  
companies for diversifying and acquiring basic science and 
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technology capabilities in such industries as  pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology and  telecommunications. However, the  
management of integrated research networks represents a major 
challenge for Japanese companies, and it remains to be seen 
how successful this strategy wll prove to be. Eisai provides one 
very successful example of upstream globalization of research 
and development. 
Because strategies can only succeed wthin the limits of the 
organization design, it  is our  conclusion tha t  Japanese  
companies will prefer localizahon and alliance strategies which 
are based on well-honed organizahon capabilities over mergers 
and acquisitions. However, because Japanese companies 
recognize the imperative of diversifying and acquiring science 
and technology capabilities in many fields, we expect increased 
experimentation with various forms of global research and 
development networks. In addition, we expect greater effort at 
internationalizing the research staffs of domestic research and 
development centers by recruitment of world class scientists and 
engineers to work in Japan. 
References 
ABB, 1991, Mission, Values, and Policies (ABB Internal Publicahon) 
Banks, P., and J. Baranson, 1993, New Concepts for Transnational 
Strategic Alhances. Plannlng Revlew 2 1 (6). 28-3 1 
Bartlett, C.A., 1990, Corning Incorporated A Network of Alliances, 
Harvard Buslness School C ,se Study 9-39 1- 102 
Bartlett, C.A., and S Ghoshal, 1988, Organizing for Worldwide 
Effechveness - The Transnational Solution, California Management 
Revlew (Fall), 54-74 
Bartlett, C A ,  and S Ghoshal, 1989, Managing Across Borders The 
Transnahonal Soluhon (Harvard Business School Press, Boston). 
Bartlett, C A ,  and S Ghoshal, 1993, Beyond the M-Form Toward a 
Managenal Theory of a Firm, Strategic Management Journal 14, 
23-46 
Bell, D., 1973, The Coming of Post-Industnal Society A Venture in 
Social Forecastmg (Basic Books, New York) 
Bloom. J L., 1990, Japan as a Scienhfic and Technological Superpower 
(Potomac, N4 D Technology Internahonal) 
Burton, F , and F. Saelens, 1994, Internahonal Alliances as a Strategic 
Tool of Japanese Electronic Companies, in N Campbell and F 
Managrng Global Competrtron Japanese Companres rn Transrtron 2 1 
Burton, eds . Japanese Mulhnatlonals, Strategles and Management 
in the Global m s h a ,  3 1-40 (Routledge, London). 
Busmess Week, 1992, Tosh~ba Rethlnlung the Way It Does Busmess 
(Apnl27) 
Buslness Week, 1993. How a Team of Buckeyes Helped Honda Save a 
Bundle (September 13) 
Bustness Week, 1994, Borderless Management (May 23) 
Carncross, D , 1994, The Strategic Role of Japanese R&D Centers m 
the U K , in N Campbell and  F Burton, eds  : Japanese  
Mulhnahonals, Strategles and Management in the Global Kasha. 
3 1-40 (Routledge, London) 
Collms, D J , 199 1, A Resource-Based Analysis of Global Compehbon 
The Case of Beanngs Industry, Strategic Management Journal 12, 
49-68 
Courtis, K S , 1994, Japan in the 1990s To Stlll Hlgher Levels of 
Performance, in J Whitney ed Doing Business in Japan, An 
Insider's Guide, 1-24 (Key Porter Books, Toronto). 
Culnan, M , and M Markus, 1987, Information Technolog~es, m Jablin 
F L , Putman K Roberts, and Porter L. eds : Handbook of 
Organlzational Cornmunlcation An Interdisciplinary Perspective, 
420-443 (Sage. Newbury Park. CA). 
Chang, Sea Jin, 1995, International Expansion Strategy of Japanese 
Firms. Capability Building Through Sequenhal Entry. Academy of 
Management 38. 383-407 
Daft, R L , and A Y Lemn, 1993, Where are the Theones for the "New" 
Organizational Forms? An Editonal Essay, Organization Science 
4(1-4) 
Doty, D Harold, William H Glick, and Gerage P Huber, 1993, Fit, 
Equlfinality, and Organlzational Effectiveness: A Test of Two 
Configurations Theorles, Academy of Management Journal 36, 
1196-1250. 
Doz, Y L , and C.K Prahalad, 1991, Managing DMNCS A Search for a 
New Paradigm, Strategic Management Journal 12, 145- 164 
Droege, W ,  1994, The Outlook for Corporate Structures at a Time of 
Upheaval A Comparative Study of Germany, Japan, and the U.S 
(forthcoming) 
Dumane, B., 1991, The Bureaucracy Busters, Fortune 123, 36-51 
Economist, 199 1, Management Brlef when bridge caught fire 
(September 7) 
Economlst, 1993, Independence as  a State of Mind (Apnl 10) 
Economlst. 1994, The Discreet Charm of the Multicultural 
Multinat~onal (July 30) 
Economlst, 1994, Malung a Meal of Mergers (September 10). 
Economlst, 1994, They Lost Thelr Shirts (November 19) 
22 Seoul Journal of Busmess 
Financial Times. 1991, Bridgestone to Inject $1.4 bn Capital Into U S 
Tyre Operation (May 17) 
Fortune, 1993, How Toshiba Makes Alliances Work (October 41. 
Fulk, J , and G. DeSanctis, 1999, Articulation of Commun~cation 
Technology and Organizahonal Form. in G. DeSanchs and J. Fulk, 
eds. Shaping Organization Form: Communication, Connection, 
and Community (Sage, Newbury Park, CA) 
Galbraith, J.K., 1967, The New Industrial State (Houghton Mifflin, 
Boston). 
Graham, E M., 1974, Oligopolist~c Imitation and European Direct 
Investment m the United States (Graduate School of Business 
Administration, Harvard University, Boston, MA). 
Graham, E.M.. 1978, Transatlanhc Investment by Multinahonal F'lrms: 
A Rivalistic Phenomenon, Journal of Post-Keynes~an Economics 
(Fall), 82-99. 
Gresov, Christopher, and Robert Drazin, 1997, Equifinality: Functional 
Equivalence m Organizahon Design. The Academy of Management 
Review 22, 403-428. 
Grover, R., 1994, MCA: A rift runs through ~ t ,  Business Week (October 
31). 
Hage, J , 1988. Futures of Organuations Innovating to Adapt Strategy 
and Human Resources to Rapid Technological Change (Lexhigton 
Books, Lerdngton, MA) 
Halden, T., 199 1, Now Akira Yein really has to burn rubber, Business 
Week (May 27). 
Hamel, G., 199 1, Competition for Competence and Interpartner 
Learning within International Strategic Alliances. strategic 
Management Journal 12, 83- 103. 
Hamel, G , and C.K. Prahalad, 1994, Competmg for the Future, Harvard 
Business Review (July-August), 122- 128. 
Harnel, G., Y.L Doz, and C K. hahalad, 1989, Collaborate w th  Your 
Competitors - and Win, Harvard Business Review (January- 
February), 133- 139. 
Hedlund, G., 1986, The Hypemodern MNC. A Heterarchy? Human 
Resource Management (Spring), 9-35. 
Hedlung, G., and D Rolander, 1990, Action in Heterarchies: New 
Approaches to Managmg the MNC: m C. Bartlett, Y. Doz, and G. 
Hedlund, eds. : Managing the Global Firm, 15-46 (Routledge, 
London). 
Hennart, J . F  , and Y R. Park, 1994, Location, Governance, and 
Strateg~c Determinants of Japanese Manufacturing Investment in 
the Uruted States. Strateg~c Management Journal 15. 419-436. 
Huber, G , 1984, The Nature and Design of Pos t - Indus t r~a l  
Orgmahons,  Management Science 30, 928-95 1. 
Managrng Global Compet~tron Japanese Companres rn Transrtlon 23 
Huber, G , 1990, A Theory of the Effects of Advanced Information 
Technologies on Organizahonal Deslgn Intelligence and Decision 
Malung, Academy of Management Revlew 15, 47-71. 
Illnltch, A Y., A.Y. Lewin, and R A. D'Aveni, eds  , 1998, New 
Organizational Forms and  Strategies for Managing In 
Hypercompetibve Environments. Managing in Times of Disorder. 
Hypercompetibve Organizahonal Responses (Sage, Thousand Oaks. 
CA) . 
Itami, H., 1994, The globalisation of Japanese Firms; m N. Campbell 
and F Burton, eds.: Japanese Multmat~onals, Strategies and 
Management in the Global Kaisha, 31-40 (Routledge. London). 
Ishida, H., 1986, Transferability of Japanese Human Resources 
Management Abroad, Human Resource Management 25, 103- 120. 
Johanson, J , and J Vahlne, 1977, The Internahonalisabon Process of 
the firm' A Model of Knowledge Development on Increasmg Foreign 
Commitments, Journal of Internabonal Business Studles (Spnng- 
Summer). 23-32 
Johnstone, B., 1992, Research. Setting Up on Enemy Ground, Far 
Eastern Economic Revlew 155(24), 54-55 
Johansson, J.K.. and G S Yip, 1994, Exploitmg Globaluation Potenbal 
U S and Japanese Strategies, Strategic Management Journal 15. 
579-60 1. 
Kanter, R M, 1994, Collaborative Advantage: The Art of Alliances, 
Harvard Buslness Review (July-August), 96- 108 
Katz, Daniel, and Robert L Kahn, 1978, The Soclal Psychology of 
Organuabons, 2nd ed. (John Wiley and Sons, New York). 
Kawabe, N . 1982, A Study on General Trading Company (J~kkyo 
Pubhshers, Tokyo). 
Kerr, L., 1992, Achlevlng World Class Performance Step by Step, Long 
Range Planning 25, 46-52 
Knlckerbocker, F.T.. 1973, Oligopolistic Reaction and Multlnatlonal 
Enterprise (Division of Research. Graduate School of Business 
Administrabon, Harvard University, Boston, MA). 
Lewin, A.Y , and C U. Stephens, 1993, Designing Post-Industrial 
Organlzabons. Comblnlng Theory and Pracbce, m G.P. Huber and 
W H Glick, eds . Organizational Change and Redesign, 393-409 
(Oxford University, New York). 
Lewm, A.Y., C.P. Long, and T.N. Carroll, 1998, The Co-Evoluhon of New 
Organization Forms, Worhng Paper 98-09-30, Center for Research 
on New organization Forms, Duke University 
March, J.G., L.S. Sproull, and M. Tarnuz, 1991, Learnmg from Samples 
of One or Fewer. Organization Science 2, 1-13 
Marcuse, H , 1968, Negations Essays in Crltical Theory (Penguln 
Publishers, London). 
24 Seoul Journal of Busmess 
Melin, L , 1992, Internationalization as a Strategy Process, Strategic 
Management Journal 13, 99- 1 18. 
Miles, R E , and C C Snow, 1986, Orgwahons  New Concepts for New 
Forms. Callfornia Management Revlew 28(3). 62-73 
Miles, R E . ,  and C C Snow, 1992, Causes of Failure in Network 
Orgamzahons, Callfornia Management Revlew 24(4):53-72 
MITI, 1991, White Paper on Internabonal Trade 1990 (MITI, Tokyo) 
MITI, 1992, Sangya selsaku kyoku, Kokusai Kgya ka, Gashlkei Kgya 
ka no daka, (Da 25-ka), Okurasha insatsu kyoku, Tokyo 
Nevin, J , 1989, The Bridgestone-Firestone merger an insider's 
account, Journal of Business Strategy (July-August) 10(4), 26-30 
Nolan, R. et. al., 1988, Creating the 21st Century Organuation, Stage 
by Stage 8, 1-11 
Odaka, K., 1991, Restrutunng Matsushita: MCA deal alters outlook, 
Japan Times Weekly, Internahonal Edihon (June 3-July 9) 31(22), 
1-5 
Papanastassiou, M , and R Pearce, 1994, The Internationaluahon of 
Research and Development by Japanese Enterprises, R&D 
Management 24(2), 155- 165 
Parkinson, D., and H. Amikura, 1994, Product Development m Machme 
Tool Industry Strategic Orientation and Organizational 
Capabilities, Paper presented to the International Conference on 
"New Imperatives for Managing Revoluhonary Change" (IBM Arnagl 
Homestead, Japan). 
Reich. R.. 199 1, The Work of Nations, Preparing Ourselves for 2 1st 
Century Capitalism (Knopf, New York) 
Rose, F , 1990, A New Age of Business? Fortune (October 8) 
Skeel, S , 1992, Profile Peter Bonfield, Management Today (January), 
44-46 
Smith, C , and T Major, 1990, The States nse Fujitsu set to put heat 
on IBM with ICL takeover, Far Eastern Econormc Revlew 149(31), 
46-47 
Swinbanks, D . 1993, Japan ' s  Industry Hiring More Foreign 
Researchers, Research Technology Management 36(4), 5-6 
Taylor, W , 1991, The Logic of Global Busmess. An Intemew with ABB's 
Percy Barnev~k. Harvard Buslness Revlew (March-Apnl), 9 1 - 105 
Teramoto Y ,  F J .  fichter, N. Iwasalu, T. Taka, and Y. Wakuta, 1994, 
Global Strategy in the Japanese Semiconductor Industry. 
Knowledge Creation Through Strategic Alliances, in N Campbell 
and F Burton, eds.. Japanese Multinationals, Strategies and 
Management m the Global m s h a .  3 1-40 (Routledge, London). 
Tesler, L.. 199 1, Network Computing in the 1990's. Scientific Arnencan 
(September), 86-93 
Toffler, A , 1980, The Thud Wave (Morrow, New York) 
Managlng Global Competrrlon Japanese Companies m Transltlon 25 
Vernon, R , 1966, Internahond Investments and Internahond Trade in 
the Product Life Cycle, Quarterly Journal of Economcs (May), 190- 
207 
Volberda, H W , 1998, Building the Flexlble Flrm How to Remain to 
Remam Compet~hve (Oxford University Press. New York). 
World Bank, 1993, The East Asian Economic Miracle, Economic Growth 
and Publlc Policy (Oxford University Press, New York) 
World Competitweness Report, 1993, Published by IMD and the World 
Economic Forum, Lausanne, Smtzerland. 
Yarnakawa, K , S Otalu, and T Anza, 1995, Hollywood's Real "Dream 
Team", ME1 Money wthout ME1 management, Tokyo Business 
Today (January) 63( l), 46-49 
Yoshmo, M Y , and T B Lifson, 1986, The Invls~ble Lmk: Japan's Sogo 
Shosha and the Organuahon of Trade (MIT Press, Cambndge, MA) 
